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INTRODUCTION

Writing a good Spanish-English legal dictionary is an arduous
and time consuming task. Many English juridical terms, developed
for common law legal systems, have no Spanish equivalents because the same concepts do not exist in civil law systems. For precisely the same reason, many Spanish juridical terms have no En* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. B.A., Amherst College; LL.B.,
Yale University Law School.
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glish equivalents. Even when similar concepts exist in both
languages, English and Spanish juridical terms are often simply
functional analogues whose meanings differ in important ways.
The dictionary author's task is further complicated by differences
in legal terminology within the many Spanish-language and English-language jurisdictions. The meaning of a legal term sometimes varies from country to country within the same linguistic
bloc. The writer of a bilingual legal dictionary is forced to compromise both by omitting terms and by reducing the amount of space
devoted to each term.
Since I began teaching Latin American law in 1965, I have
been searching for a really good Spanish-English/English-Spanish
legal dictionary. Henry Dahl's book is not yet that dictionary, but
it is a promising and important step in the right direction. I have
taken the effort to write a detailed review because I think that
Dahl's dictionary has great potential, and I hope that most of the
flaws which I have identified will be remedied in the next edition.
II.

STRENGTHS OF DAHL'S

Two-TIER

APPROACH

Conceptually, Dahl's legal dictionary is a significant improvement over other published Spanish-English legal dictionaries.' He
has produced a hybrid volume that is part legal dictionary and
part legal encyclopedia. Recognizing that some legal terms can be
translated by one or two synonyms or by brief explanations, while
others cannot, Dahl sensibly divides his entries into two categories:
(1) terms requiring extensive explanations on the basis of specific
codes, statutes, judicial decisions, or doctrinal works; and (2) terms
that can be defined by synonyms or brief descriptions. He includes
a substantial number of both Spanish and English juridical terms
in the former category, giving them lengthy explanations that are
far more useful than the synonyms that constitute the standard
1. These include: GUILLERMO CABANELLAS DE LA CUEVAS & ELEANOR HOAGUE, BUTTERWORTHS ENGLISH/SPANISH LEGAL DICTIONARY/ DICCIONARIO JUnfDico ESPAAOL/INGLPS
BUI-IERWORTHS (1991); STEVEN M. KAPLAN, WILEY'S ENGLISH-SPANISH AND SPANISH-ENGLISH
LEGAL DICTIONARY (1993); PATRICIA OLGA MAZZUCCO & ALEJANDRA HERE MARANGHELLO, DicCIONARIO BILINGOE DE TERMINOLOGfA JURIDICA INGLIAS-CASTELLAN0 CASTELLANO-INGLAS (2d
ed. 1992); Louis A. ROBB, DICCIONARIO DE T1RMINOS LEGALES: ESPAROL-INGLAS E INGL ks-EsPA14OL (1967); JULio ROMAAACH JR., DICTIONARY OF LEGAL TERMS SPANISH-ENGLISH/ENGLISHSPANISH (1992); GERARDO SOLIS & RAUL A. GASTEAZORO, JR., WEST'S SPANISH-ENGLISH/ENGLISH-SPANISH LAW DICTIONARY (1992); JUAN DE DioS T& ADA Y SANz, DICCIONARIO DE COMERCIO Y DERECHO EN INGLAS Y ESPAROL (1945); GEORGE N. VANSON & MARILYN R.
FRANKENTHALER, SPANISH-ENGLISH LEGAL TERMINOLOGY (1982).
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fare of most bilingual legal dictionaries.
Dahl has drawn his extensive explanations of Anglo-American
juridical terms primarily from the American Law Institute's Restatements, the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, INCOTERMS, the Uniform Commercial Code, and Puerto Rican case
law. He has taken the extensive explanations of Spanish juridical
terms primarily from the Spanish Civil, Criminal, and Commercial
Codes, the Spanish Laws of Civil and Criminal Procedure, the
Latin American Model Penal Code, Puerto Rican statutes and
cases, and the Louisiana Civil Code. Some of the translations are
original efforts by Dahl, others are taken from previously published translations.
Dahl's approach frequently works well. The expanded definitions and explanations in this dictionary are extremely useful to
anyone translating or simply using Spanish or English legal materials. Moreover, Dahl himself often does a superb job explaining the
essence of complicated concepts that lack counterparts, such as
plea bargaining or executory actions. Unfortunately, Dahl's twotier approach has a variety of theoretical and practical problems.
III.

PROBLEMS WITH DAHL'S Two-TIER APPROACH

Explanations based upon statutes or rules drawn from particular jurisdictions are a great source of strength in this dictionary,
but are also a source of weakness. Explanations taken from a single
statute or rule sometimes convey an overly specific sense of a
term's meaning. When this happens, a good dictionary should indicate that in other jurisdictions or contexts, the term may have a
different meaning. Unfortunately, Dahl's dictionary sometimes
leaves the reader without a clue about alternative meanings. For
example, Dahl explains the Spanish term citaci6n by referring to
two articles of the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure, conveying
the erroneous idea that the term means only a citation or summons
in a criminal case.2 But citaci6n also means an order by a judge to
a party, a witness, or a third party to appear at a hearing in a civil
2. Dahl's definition is:
Citation. A person charged with a punishable act must be cited only for the
purpose of being heard, unless the law shall provide otherwise or unless his immediate detention should be proper. If the person cited in accordance with the
provisions of the foregoing article should not appear nor give any good cause
which prevents him from doing so, an order of appearance may be changed into
an order of arrest.
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case. Similarly, relying on Spain's Law of Criminal Procedure,
Dahl's definition of acci6n penal states that "[a] criminal action is
public." In many Latin American countries, however, a criminal
action can also be private.'
A second problem is that transcribing definitions from statutory and case-law materials sometimes conveys more about a subject than one wants to read in a dictionary. Dahl devotes five pages
and twenty-seven entries to various forms of usufructo (the right
to use or enjoy the fruits of another's property), most of which
should either be deleted or handled by much briefer definitions.
Dahl also includes twenty-five separate entries for various types of
prescripci6n (statute of limitations) with specific time periods
drawn from particular statutes of limitations. He even has a separate entry for a ten-year limitations period. Since limitations periods vary considerably among jurisdictions, the separate entries for
different limitations periods constitute wasted space.
A third problem is that occasionally terms which need explanations are defined in terms of esoteric cognates. Thus, the Spanish crime of estelionato is simply translated into English as "stellionate," which is not used in English legal parlance. Definitions
that must be looked up in other dictionaries are not helpful. What
the reader needs to be told is that estelionato is a type of swindle
in which the swindler sells, pledges, leases, or encumbers property,
fraudulently concealing from the victim that the property has already been sold to another or is already incumbered by liens or
attachments. A fourth problem is that juridical terms which have
no equivalents or counterparts in the other language are occasionally treated as if they do. For example, amparo, an important
Latin American procedural institution that has no counterpart in
English,4 is defined simply as the "[p]rotection against the abuse
of public authority. Mandamus." This is an incomplete and misleading definition of a complex juridical term whose precise meaning varies from country to country. In Mexico, amparo is a constitutionally created summary action that can be used as a writ of
habeas corpus, injunction, declaratory judgment, or appeal.' The
3. For example, the Argentine Penal Code has three types of criminal actions: (1) the
public action, (2) a public action that must be instituted by the victim or his or her legal
representative, and the (3) private action. C6D. PEN. art. 71 (Arg.).
4. For an overview of amparo in Latin American countries, see Hector Fix Zamudio,
The Writ of Amparo in Latin America, 13 LAw. AM. 361 (1981).
5. The Mexican amparo combines five autonomous procedural functions: (1) protection
of life and liberty, (2) determination of constitutionality of legislation, (3) resolution of con-
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Argentine amparo, on the other hand, is a judicially created summary remedy to protect constitutional rights and guarantees other
than personal liberty. Unlike the Mexican amparo, the Argentine
amparo cannot be used as a substitute for habeas corpus or appeal.
Whereas the Mexican amparo can be used only to challenge state
action, the Argentine amparo will lie against actions of private
groups such as unions.
A fifth problem is that some concepts that have equivalents or
counterparts are treated as though they do not. For example, the
Spanish term buques mercantes has an English counterpart-merchant vessels. Yet Dahl inexplicably devotes two whole
pages with lengthy entries taken from the Spanish Commercial
7
Code to explain a term that needs little explanation. In the process, Dahl wastes considerable space that could more profitably be
used to define important juridical terms omitted from the dictionary. The same problem occurs with servidumbre, which has
equivalents in English-easement or servitude. Indeed, on the
Spanish side, Dahl simply defines servidumbre by the synonym
"easement." On the English side, however, he uses six pages to
cover thirty-two separate entries for various types of servidumbres,
all of which could have been covered in half a page.
IV.

MISLEADING ASPECTS OF DEFINITIONS

My principal reservation about Dahl's dictionary is that it is
flicts from administrative acts and decisions, (4) appeals from judicial decisions, and (5)
protection of peasant rights in agrarian reform. Hector Fix Zamudio, El problema de La
lentitud de los procesos y su solucibn en el ordenamiento mexicano, 21 REv. FAc. DERECHO
MEx. 85, 116 (1971).
6. See generally Judgment of Sept. 5, 1958 (S.R.L. Samuel Kot), Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Naci6n, 241 Fallos 291 (Arg.). In September 1967, Article 321 of a new national Civil and Commercial Procedural Code, Law 17.454 27-C ANALES DE LE ISLACI6N ARGENINA 2672, 2724, expressly provided for amparo against acts or omissions of individuals
which injure constitutionally protected rights. See generally GERMAN J. BIDART CAmpos,
REGIMEN LEGAL v JRISPRUDENIZCL DEL Arxaxo 109-10, 115-17 (1968); Thomas Roberts,
The Writ of Amparo: A Remedy to Protect ConstitutionalRights in Argentina, 31 OHIO ST.
L.J. 831 (1970).
7. Merchant vessels is followed by this curious array of sub-entries: merchant vessels
attacked by a privateer; builders of merchant vessels; the first mate of a merchant vessel;
the complement of merchant vessels; attachment and sale of merchant vessels; part ownership in merchant vessels; pilot of merchant vessels; owner and agent of merchant vessels;
and sale of merchant vessels. In Spanish: buques mercantes, ataque por un corsario; buques
mercantes, constructores; buques mercantes, contramaestre;buques mercantes, dotaci6n;
buques mercantes, embargo y venta; buques mercantes, participe en La propiedad;buques
mercantes, piloto; buques mercantes, propietario y naviero; buques mercantes, venta.

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:3

sometimes misleading. While the great bulk of the definitions are
accurate, a not insubstantial number in both English and Spanish
require modification or clarification in order to prevent them from
being misleading. The principal ways in which this dictionary occasionally misleads are by: (1) explaining only part of a multi-faceted
concept, (2) failing to include essential characteristics of the defined term, and (3) ascribing an incorrect meaning to a term.
A.

Explaining Only Part of a Multi-Faceted Concept

This dictionary occasionally oversimplifies. Many terms have
multiple meanings, and a good dictionary should indicate to the
reader, usually by numbers, when terms have multiple meanings.
Unfortunately, Dahl's dictionary frequently does not do this. Indeed, sometimes the user is left totally unaware of other meanings.
Thus, the Spanish side contains the following partial and confusing
definition of the U.S. "abstention doctrine":
Doctrina de la abstencibn, mediante la cual los tribunales
federales ceden su competencia a los tribunales estatales para
evitar inmiscuirse en cuestiones de administracibninterna.Por
ejemplo, casos de derecho de familia.

But the federal courts have developed several abstention doctrines. Dahl's definition more or less explains Burford-type abstention,9 but the reference to family law is confusing. Dahl, however,
makes no mention of three other important forms of federal abstention doctrines: (1) Pullman abstention,1" (2) Thibodaux abstention," and (3) Younger abstention.1 2 Similarly, convenio is
8. This translation is as follows: the doctrine of abstention, the means by which the
federal courts cede their jurisdiction to state courts to avoid intermeddling in questions of
internal administration. Family law, for example. (author's translation).
9. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), is the paradigm for the type of federal
court abstention deemed appropriate because of a need to defer to complex state administrative procedures.
10. Pullman-type abstention is invoked where an unclear state statute has not been
definitively construed by the state courts and a construction might reasonably be placed
upon it that would avoid the necessity of deciding a federal constitutional issue. Providing
one of the parties makes a reservation on the record of a desire to return to federal court,
the federal district court will retain jurisdiction while the parties seek resolution of the statutory construction issue in the state courts. The paradigm case is Railroad Comm'n. of Tex.
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
11. Thibodaux-type abstention is utilized in diversity cases when state law is unclear,
and there is an important state interest intimately concerned with sovereign prerogatives of
the state. The paradigm case is Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360
U.S. 25 (1959).
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translated only as "settlement," but it can also mean a convention,
agreement, contract, treaty, or pact.
Certain Spanish legal terms are particularly difficult to translate because they have multiple meanings, depending upon the
context. Dolo is one of those particularly difficult terms. Dahl correctly, but only partially, translates it as "criminal intent, deceit,
fraud, deception, ruse, trickery, and swindle." But in a tort context, dolo also means gross negligence, wanton and wilful misbehaviour, or intentional misconduct. Boleto de compraventa is
translated as a "[b]ill of sale. Deed." In some countries, such as
Argentina, however, boleto de compraventa actually means a bilateral promise of sale or an agreement of sale-the precursor or preliminary agreement to the sale of real property. It is not a deed to
real property.'8
B. Failing to Include Essential Characteristicsof the Defined Term
Some of Dahl's definitions omit critical aspects of the term being defined. For example, the Spanish term dependiente is translated only as "dependent, helpless, reliant." But dependiente is far
broader, also including agents, representatives, employees, and servants. The breadth of this definition can be critical because respondeat superior liability in civil law countries is normally imposed on the employer or master of the house for the torts of all
his dependientes.
Similarly, the sociedad de responsibilidadlimitada, an important form of business organization in civil law countries, is poorly
defined only as a "limited partnership." The sociedad de responsibilidad limitada is actually a limited liability company whose
capital is divided into quotas among a limited number of quotaholders whose liability is limited to unpaid subscriptions for quotas. It can be structured as either a corporation or partnership for
U.S. tax purposes, depending upon how the bylaws are drafted.
One of the most complex civil law concepts is the juristic or
12. Younger-type abstention is utilized to prevent federal courts from interfering with
ongoing proceedings in the state courts. Beginning with a holding that federal courts as a
general rule may not enjoin ongoing criminal proceedings, this abstention doctrine has been
extended to state civil and administrative proceedings. The paradigm case is Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
13. See 4 ALBERTO G. SPOTA, INSTITUICONES DE DERECHO CIVIL CONTRATOS 57-59 (1979).
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juridical act (acto jurdico), which Dahl defines inadequately as
"[liegal act, juridical act." The juristic act is a fundamental concept in the civil law and is the subject of a huge amount of scholarly writing. It has no common law equivalent and, therefore, requires at least an explanatory paragraph.' 4
The same kind of oversimplification occurs in rendering Anglo-American juridical terms into Spanish. Thus, "injunction" is
defined for the Spanish reader as interdictoprobitorio (literally, a
prohibitory interdiction). Nothing indicates that an injunction is
an equitable remedy, that it can order someone to do something or
refrain from doing something, or that it will be issued only when
the requesting party has no adequate legal remedy. Demurrer is
defined only as excepci6n previa (preliminary objection). The
Spanish user should be told that the demurrer is a pleading that
tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint by admitting arguendo
all its factual allegations. The Anglo-American concept of summary judgment is explained by two substantial paragraphs in
Spanish, one curiously dealing with summary judgment for the
plaintiff and the other summary judgment for the defendant. Unfortunately, neither explains that the crucial requirement for
granting a motion for summary judgment is the absence of any significant issue of fact for trial.
C. Ascribing an Incorrect Meaning to a Term
A few definitions in this dictionary are simply wrong. Usucapi6n, the civil law analogue to adverse possession, is incorrectly
translated as a "[s]tatute of limitations. Prescription." Usucapi6n
permits acquisition of title to land by the running of the statute of
limitations, but it should not be confused with a statute of limitations or prescription. Acciones nominativas, which are registered
shares, is misleadingly defined as "[s]hares payable to order." Dahl
might have been thinking of acciones nominativas endosables,
14. The juristic act has been defined as an act:
by which the party or parties declare their intention of effecting changes in legal
relations and to which the law attaches the power of producing such changes.
The [juridical act] . . . is wider than the term contract or even agreement. It
includes, e.g. a notice to a tenant, a declaration by which one party avoids a
contract on the ground of fraud, the grant of authority to an agent, the making
of a will, etc.
ARTHUR VON MEHREN, THE CivIL LAW SYSTEm 467 (1957) (quoting I MANUAL OF GERMAN
LAW 42 (1950)).
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which are shares registered in the name of a determined person or
his order. His definition, however, is off the mark and is likely to
cause confusion with bearer shares (acciones al portador), an important juridical concept that inexplicably is omitted from this dictionary. Compaihero/a de vida, which means a lifelong companion,
is incorrectly translated as:
Common-law spouse. In several Latin American countries consensual or informal marriages are given full legal effect. Such is,
for instance, the case of El Salvador. Literally this expression
means "companion for life."
There is no common-law marriage in civil law countries. A compahero is a spouse only if formally married to the other party.
While parties to informal marriages are afforded certain rights in
some Latin American countries, these rights are not fully equal to
those of a legal spouse. Curiously, the terms concubina or uni6n de
hecho, which are frequently used in Latin American legislation to
refer to informal unions, are not cross-referenced, and the latter
term does not even appear in this dictionary.
Occasionally, a legal term is defined by two words, one of
which is accurate while the other one is not. Thus, usura is defined
as "usury, racketeering." Usury is a correct translation, but racketeering is quite a different concept that is associated with usury
only when it takes the form of loan sharking. Similarly, devaluaci6n is defined as "devaluation, inflation." The former is correct,
but the latter is not. Inflation and devaluation are two distinct,
albeit interrelated, concepts. Inflation refers to changes in a nation's internal price levels or its currency's domestic purchasing
power. Devaluation refers to changes in a currency's external
purchasing power because of downward adjustments in the foreign
exchange rate. A country may have a significant amount of inflation without devaluing its currency, or a country may devalue its
currency without having a significant amount of inflation. In the
long-run, inflation generally causes a country to devalue its currency, but in the short-run countries often avoid devaluing their
currency despite substantial rates of inflation.1 5

15. See KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION 3 (1982).
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OMISSIONS

Another reservation I have about Dahl's dictionary is that it is
unduly omissive. Bilingual dictionaries, even more so than ordinary
dictionaries, must be selective, for space limitations make it impossible to be all-inclusive. Unfortunately, Dahl exacerbates the problem by wasting so much space on certain terms. This dictionary's
omissions often seem more accidental than planned. For some unknown reason, this dictionary is strikingly unbalanced. It has 7,206
entries on the Spanish side versus only 3,674 entries on the English
side, a ratio of about two to one. This is not a feature shared by
other Spanish-English legal dictionaries.
Some forms of omission cut across all entries. Dahl's dictionary fails to indicate the part of speech of the term being defined. It
is often extremely helpful to know whether a foreign term is a
noun or a verb, and if the latter, whether it is transitive or intransitive. It would also be helpful to know whether a noun or adjective
is masculine or feminine. This dictionary also has very few abbreviations. Other than INCOTERMS, it contains virtually no
abbreviations.
A second form of omission is more sporadic. A number of juridical terms that should be grouped together are not. For example, after the entry acreedor (creditor), one finds acreedor con gravamen (lien creditor) acreedorsolidario (joint creditor), acreedores
privilegiados (preferred creditors), and acreedores singularmente
privilegiados (specially preferred creditors), but one looks in vain
for other important types of creditors.16 This problem is aggravated by the failure to cross-reference terms. Thus, the term
quirografario(unsecured creditor) appears separately, but there is
no cross-reference to acreedor.Consequently, the user is forced to
piece together terms from various parts of the dictionary.
A third type of omission is the quixotic failure to include certain basic legal terms in both English and Spanish. A basic term
like "cause of action" is omitted, while an unimportant term like
16. These include; acreedor anticrtico, acreedor comrnn, acreedor de dominio, acreedor de la masa, acreedor de la sucesi6n, acreedor del heredero, acreedor del concurso,
acreedor del fallido, acreedor de regreso, acreedor ejecutante, acreedor embargante, acreedor escriturario, acreedor guarantizado, acreedor hereditario, acreedor inferior, acreedor hipotecario, acreedor mancomunado, acreedor ordinario, acreedor personal, acreedor pignoraticio, acreedor por falo, acreedor quirografario, acreedor real, acreedor
refaccionario,acreedor sencillo, acreedor superior.
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"causes the seal to be affixed" is included. Jurisdiction in personam appears, but jurisdiction in rem is omitted. Property and
property right are omitted from the English side, but not from the
Spanish. Instead the English includes property insurance and proprietary right. A critical category of civil law damages, daifo moral
(moral damages or non-pecuniary damages), is omitted. Instead
daha emocional (emotional damages), a sub-category of moral
damages, appears.
A fourth omission problem concerns commonly used Latin
terms. Dahl tells us that he made a conscious decision to omit
Latin words unless used currently in one system but not used in
the other. Unfortunately, that sensible policy choice is not always
adhered to in the dictionary. Curiously, habeas corpus, translated
as habeas corpus, appears on the Spanish side but not the English
side. See Appendix A for a list of some Latin terms that are
omitted.
In addition to the terms already discussed there are a fairly
substantial number of important concepts omitted from both sides
of Dahl's dictionary. See Appendix B for a list of omitted English
words and Appendix C for a list of Spanish.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Hopefully, most of these errors and omissions will be rectified
in the second edition. Despite them, this dictionary is a very useful
addition to the existing collection of Spanish-English legal dictionaries. With a little more work and substantial editing, this could
become the preeminent Spanish-English legal dictionary.
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APPENDIX A
Some of the Latin terms commonly used in Spanish, but not
in English that are omitted include: a contrario sensu, a quo, ab
intestato, ad effectum videndi, ad quem, affectio societatis, animus domini, causa contrahendi, causa petendi, cautio, culpa in
contrahendo, de lege ferenda, de lege lata, exceptio non adimpleti
contractus, exceptio veritatis, extra petitum, in dubio pro operario, in dubio pro reo, in fraudem legis, in rem verso, Jura novit
curia, lure gestionis, iure imperii, iuris et de iure, iuris tantum,
ius cogens, ius dispositivum, ius posterius derogat priori, ius
preferendi, ius utendi, lato sensu, mandatum solvitur morte, mens
legis, negotiorum gestio, non bis in idem, non compos mentis,
nudum pactum, nulla poena sine lege, nullum crimen sine lege,
plus petitio, propter rem, ratio iuris, rebus sic stantibus, res nullius, solutio indebiti, stricto sensu, ultra petita, volenti non fit
iniuria.
Some of the Latin terms commonly used in English, but not in
Spanish that are omitted include: coram nobis, damnum absque
injuria, dictum, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, in pari
delicto, in para materia, jus tertii, mens rea, modus operandi,
nolle prosequi, non obstante verdicto, obiter dicta, quantum meruit, quare clausum fregit, qui tam, quo warranto, per curiam, pro
hac vice, ratio decidendi, remittitur damna, res gestae, respondeat superior, scienter, subpoena ad testificandum, subpoena duces tecum.
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APPENDIX B
Some of the more salient omissions from the English side include: additur, authorized issue, bad check, bad debt, bad faith,
bail bond, balance sheet, balloon note, bench trial, bench warrant,
beneficial interest, beneficial use, beyond a reasonable doubt standard, black letter law, blue chip stocks, boiler plate, bona fide purchaser, capital gains or losses, capital offense, capital punishment,
case of first impression, cautionary instruction, charitable contribution, charitable deduction, clean hands, clean bill of lading, clear
and present danger doctrine, clear title, color of title, compulsory
joinder, conditional fee, condition precedent, condition subsequent,
conflicts of laws, conjugal rights, consortium, constructive malice,
constructive trust, contempt of court, contingent estate, co-sign,
deadly force, decedent, defeasance, defeasible, demur, deponent,
derogation, detainer, detinue, dower, dowry, eminent domain, entrapment, equal protection, equitable estoppel, equitable servitude,
escheat, establishment clause, euthanasia, exclusionary rule, executive privilege, exhaustion of remedies, extenuating circumstances,
extinguishment, fair use, false arrest, federal common law, felony
murder rule, fixture, foreseeability, forbearance, foundation, free
exercise clause, freedom of contract, fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine, frustration of contract, frustration of purpose, gag order,
garnishee, general obligation bond, gerrymander, good Samaritan
doctrine, gold clause, governmental immunity, grandfather clause,
grand larceny, guarantee clause, habitability, harassment, hold
harmless agreement, holographic will, home rule, hung jury, impeachment, impleader, implied consent, implied contract, implied
easement, impossibility, inalienable rights, in camera inspection,
inchoate, inchoate lien, incorporation by reference, incumbrance,
indecency, infringement, ingress and egress, insanity, insanity defense, insider trading, intangibles, intangible property, intestacy,
investiture, joint liability, judicial review, juror, justiciable, leasehold, legal aid, letter of credit, letter of intent, leverage, lien, life
estate, limited jurisdiction, maritime law, mental anguish, mental
cruelty, miscegenation, mitigation of damages, modus operandi,
money judgment, mortgagor, mutual mistake, nominal damages,
nonfeasance, no-par stock, overbreadth, pain and suffering, patent
infringement, penalty clause, pendent jurisdiction, peremptory
challenge, performance bond, petit jury, piercing the corporate
veil, police power, political question, post nuptial agreement, preemption, prejudicial error, preliminary hearing, preliminary injunc-
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tion, privity, products liability, proxy, public domain, public easement, public policy, quash, quiet enjoyment, quiet title, quitclaim
deed, reapportionment, reasonable man standard, reliance, remainder, rescission, restraining order, restraint on alienation, reverse
discrimination, reverter, right of way, ripeness, scrivener, seasonable, self-dealing, separation of powers, service of process, servient
estate, servitude, sodomy, solvency, spending power, standing, statute of limitations, strict scrutiny, substantive due process, summation, tender offer, title search, treasure trove, treble damages, trust
indenture, turn key operation, undue influence, venire, waiver,
warranty, waste, watered stock, work product, worthier title, writ
of mandamus, and writ of prohibition.
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APPENDIX C
On the Spanish side, some of the more salient omissions include: acci6n accesoria, acci6n aquiliana,acci6n cambiaria,acci6n
cautelar, accibn constitutiva, acci6n declarativa, acci6n popular,
acefalia, anuencia,anulable, apropiar,aqui me remito, arbitrable,
arbitrador,arbitrar,arbitrio,arras,arrendable,arrestar,asamblea
general de accionistas, asegurable, asegurar, asesinar, aciento,
asilado, asilar, atentado,6 atestado, atestar, atestiguar,auditor,
autenticar, auttntico, auto de presi6n, auto resolutorio, baldio,
barrio, beneficiencia, bienes raices, bienes semovientes, bienes adventicios, burlar la ley, buscapleitos, buz6n, cabildo, cdmara de
apelaciones, capital social, capital no desembolsado, capital emitido, capital en giro, capital en degrado, capital liquido, capital
mobiliario, capital realizado, corromper, cdula de citaci6n, cdula de emplazamiento, citaci6n por cdula, citacibn por edictos,
concurrencia desleal, concurso preventivo, contratos innominados,
correcci6n monetaria, curso forzoso, damnificado, depreciaci6n
monetaria, derecho administrativo, derecho internacional
privado, desamparar la apelaci6n, desvalorizaci6n monetaria,
deudas de valor, divorciar,domiciliado, doy fe, duedas dinerarias,
ejido, endosar, entidad, excarcelaci6n, fondo de comercio,
hacendado,hacendista, hato, homocidio culposo, homocidio intencional, impetracibn, indexaci6n, interponer apelaci6n, juez arbitral, juez "a quo," juez "ad quem," juez de paz, juicio de consignaci6n, juicio percicial, juicio politico, juicio sumario, juicio
sumarisimo, jurador,juzgado correcional,juzgado de primra instancia, ladronicio, mdcula, madrasta, magisterial,mancomunar,
manumisi6n, obligaciones de dar, obligaciones de hacer, obligaciones de no hacer, orden ptblico, pecuario, peculio, prebenda,
protocolaci6n, recopilaci6n, resguardar,semanario, semestral, sociedad de hecho, sociedad vinculada, socio accionista, solidaridad
activa, solidaridadpasiva, subfiador, sucesi6n forzosa, teoria de la
imprevisi6n, terreno baldio, terreno edificado, titulo de crkdito,
titulo de la dueda pablica, titulo ejecutivo, tributaci6n, ubicacibn,
ubicar, urna, valor nominal, venta contra documentos, yacimiento
mineral, zona franca.

16. Atentado normally means a criminal attempt. Dahl includes only atentado contra
libertad de comercio, which is a restraint of trade.

